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PLANT RELOCATION AND THE COLLECTIVE-
BARGAINING OBLIGATION
BETTY SOUTHARD MURPHYt
An employer's decision to relocate or close aplant can have a dev-
astating impact on the affected employees. Similarly, keeping an obso-
lete and unproductive plant open can have a devastating effect on
employers and employees. Thus, plant relocations and closures have
become an important problem in all parts of the country, including the
South. Unions have attempted to have changes in the operation of a
business, including relocations and closures, declared mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, even f the
changes are motivated by economic reasons only. In this Article, Mrs.
Murphy, former Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board,
traces the history of the Board and the courts in this area andfinds that
tension between the Board'and the judiciary has resulted in a confused
state of law. Moreover, the inability of the Board to fashion fair and
effective remedies when violations have been foundfurther exacerbates
this confusion. Mrs. Murphy concludes that these matters must be re-
solved before progress can be made in solving existingproblems as well
as other potential problems, such as whether relocations to foreign
countries should or should not be treated as mandatory subjects of col-
lective bargaining.
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1962 Fibreboard decision,1 the National Labor Relations Board
ruled that sections 8(a)(5) 2 and 8 (d)3 of the National Labor Relations Act
required an employer to bargain with a union over subcontracting bargaining
unit work, even though the employer's decision to subcontract was motivated
t Partner, Baker & Hostetler, Washington, D.C.; B.A., Ohio State Univ.; J.D., American
Univ. Law School. Mrs. Murphy is a former Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board
and Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. Mrs. Murphy
wishes to express her appreciation to Joseph Moore, Director of Special Research at the NLRB,
for his comprehensive assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), aj'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) [here-
inafter referred to as Fibreboard II].
2. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... [t]o refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
3. For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable tunes and confer m good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question aris-
ing thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
Id. § 158(d) (1976).
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entirely by economic considerations. Despite affirmation by the U.S. Supreme
Court seventeen years ago,4 this area has yet to be clearly defined. The deci-
sion did, however, set the stage for unions to argue that an employer's decision
to make economically-motived operational changes other than subcontracting
should also be the subject of mandatory bargaining.
Unions-and frequently the Board and the courts-have had to contend
with numerous operational changes that result in the loss of bargaining unit
jobs, including subcontracting, plant relocations, and plant closures. These
operational changes are by no means recent phenomena. To the contrary, the
ability and freedom of American employers to respond to technological
changes has been one of the major strengths of the U.S. economy since the
Industrial Revolution transformed this country from a largely agrarian society
to a modem industrial state. Nevertheless, until World War II, operational
changes undertaken by American employers generally did not include foreign
investment, except as was necessary to supply natural resources. Beginning
after World War II and accelerating during the 1950's and 1960's, investment
in natural resources has been replaced by foreign investment in manufacturing
industries. The primary vehicle for this direct investment has been the mul-
tinational corporation (MNC).5
The U.S. labor movement vigorously argues that direct foreign invest-
ment in the form of MNCs has caused the loss of jobs at home. To combat
these job losses, labor has sought to impose restrictions on the growth of
MNCs and limitations on the rise of imports. United States unions have not,
however-as they have with job losses resulting from the transfer of work
within the U.S.6-pushed to have an MNC's decision to relocate to a foreign
country (and the effects thereof on U.S. workers) declared a mandatory subject
of bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act.7
For whatever reason, perhaps because the issue has not been directly
presented, the NLRB has not firmly required an MNC to bargain about the
decision to transfer work from a bargaining unit in this country to a foreign
location.8 Although it has been argued that the Board has the authority to
require bargaining over these decisions, 9 whether it chooses to exercise that
authority is another matter.' 0
The purpose of this Article is to examine (1) the origin and development
of the Fibreboard doctrine, particularly its application to plant relocations, (2)
4. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
5. Hawkins, Foreword to AMERICAN LABOR AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION Vii-
xvii (D. Kojawa ed. 1973).
6. See notes 18-82 and accompanying text infra.
7. Cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), afl'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)
(subcontracting bargaining unit work mandatory subject of bargaining).
8. But see Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 776 (1977), enforced, 604 F.2d 109
(6th Cir. 1979).
9. See North Am. Soccer League, 236 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1978).
10. See generally B. Murphy, Multinational Corporations and Free Coordinated Transna-
tional Bargaining: An Alternative to Protectionism? 17 (August 1977) (speech at Manila World
Law Conference, Manila, The Philippines).
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judicial response to Board forays in this area, (3) the remedies devised by the
Board in relocation cases, "l and (4) the applicability, if any, of Board policy to
decisions by MNCs to transfer bargaining unit work to foreign countries.
II. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FIBEBOARD DOCTRINE
Section 8(5) of the original Wagner Act (now section 8(a)(5)) made it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representative of its employees.' 2 The only allusion to the nature of this obli-
gation is by reference to section 9(a) of the Act, which provides that the desig-
nated representative shall be the "exclusive representative" for collective-
bargaining purposes with respect to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment."' 3
Both the statute and the legislative history are silent with respect to the
NLRB's authority to specify compulsory subjects of bargaining. Soon after its
creation, however, the Board began to define on a case-by-case basis those
subjects within the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment,"' 4 in which bargaining is "mandatory," with both parties free to
insist to impasse on their respective positions, and those subjects outside the
employment relationship, in which bargaining is "permissive." The Supreme
Court placed its imprimatur on the Board's general approach to this area in
the famous Borg- Warner case.' 5
For the first twenty-seven years of the Act, until Fibreboard II in 1962, the
Board usually (but not invariably) found a violation of section 8(a)(5) in oper-
ational changes only when anti-union motivation could be inferred. 16 While
the Board did suggest that economically motivated changes may not be be-
yond the pale of section 8(a)(5), no clear theory emerged because the Board
11. This Article will focus primarily on plant relocations that are economically motivated.
Because the remedies devised are virtually the same, however, and because it places this matter in
an historical context, some attention will be directed toward so-called "runaway shops," ie., relo-
cations that are undertaken because the employer seeks to penalize its employees for selecting a
union or to avoid its bargaining obligation to the union.
12. Ch. 372, § 8(5), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976)).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See also id. § 158(d).
14. Id. § 158(d).
15. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
16. In finding no violation in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961)
[hereinafter referred to as Fibreboard I], the Board rejected the General Counsel's argument that
an employer must bargain over economically-motivated operational decisions because it lacked
supporting precedent and conflicted with existing case law. Board decisions on this point between
1945 and 1962, however, are confusing, if not inconsistent. Compare Mahoning Mining Co., 61
N.L.R.B. 792, 803 (1945), in which the Board, in dictum, absolved an employer of an obligation to
bargain about changing his business structure or selling or contracting out part of his operation,
with Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 504 (1946), in which the Board affirmed a trial
examiner's finding that the employer violated § 8(5) by "refusing to bargain regarding the subcon-
tracting of work." Id. at 504. See also Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 494 (1959), in which
the Board found a violation of§ 8(a)(5) for the employer's failure to bargain with the union "as to
whether the independent contractor system of distribution should be adopted." Id. at 497. For a
comprehensive summary of pre-Fibreboard decisions, see Comment, Employer's Duty to Bargain
about Subcontracting and Other "Management Decisions" 64 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 301-03 (1964).
1980]
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failed "to articulate unambiguously the distinction between the impact of a
change and the decision to adopt it.' 17
4. Fibreboard and Town & Country
For the Board, at least, any ambiguity regarding an employer's obligation
to bargain about the decision to make operational changes, as opposed to the
effects of making such changes, disappeared between 1961 and 1962 when the
Board decided Fibreboard 1,18 Town & Country Manufacturing Co., 19 and
Fibreboard 11.20
In Fibreboard I the employer, concerned with increased maintenance
costs, determined that substantial savings could be realized if its maintenance
work was contracted out. The Trial Examiner, whose findings were adopted
by the Board, concluded that the employer's motivation in contracting out this
work was economic, not discriminatory. The Trial Examiner also concluded
that the employer was under no obligation to discuss the decision to subcon-
tract with the union. In his exceptions the General Counsel contended that the
decision involved "conditions of employment" and, accordingly, subcontract-
ing was a mandatory subject of bargaining.21 The Board, however, rejected
the General Counsel's arguments and limited bargaining to the effects of this
change in operations.
A year later, in Town and Country Manufacturing Co., the Board
repudiated Fibreboard I. Rejecting the "management prerogative" argument
that carried the day in Fibreboard I, the Board concluded that "the elimina-
tion of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons, is a matter within the statutory
phrase 'other terms and conaitions of employment' and is a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act."'22
In response to the dissent's contention that the Board's holding impinges on an
employer's freedom "to make the decision," the majority observed:
This obligation to bargain in nowise restrains an employer from for-
mulating or effectuating an economic decision to terminate a phase
of his business operations. Nor does it obligate him to yield to a
union's demand that a subcontract not be let, or that it be let on
terms inconsistent with management's business judgment. Experi-
ence has shown, however, that candid discussion of mutual problems
by labor and management frequently results in their resolution with
attendant benefit to both sides. Business operations may profitably
continue and jobs may be preserved. Such prior discussion with a
duly designated bargaining representative is all that the Act contem-
17. Comment, supra note 16, at 303.
18. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961).
19. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962).
20. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
21. The General Counsel relied on Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 494 (1959). See note
16 supra.
22. 136 N.L.R.B. at 1027.
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plates. But it commands no less. 23
The Board, however, also found that the termination of the employees in-
volved in Town & Country was discriminatorily motivated and violative of
section 8(a)(3). 24 Therefore, the finding of a section 8(a)(5) violation was in
the nature of dictum.
Five months later the Board reaffirmed its Town & Country position in
reconsidering Fibreboard I, and the about face was complete. In overruling
Fibreboard I the Board made clear that anti-union motivation was no longer
the sine qua non for finding that changes in an employer's business opera-
tions-both the decision and its effects-required negotiation with the
union.25 The Board's order in Fibreboard II required the employer to reinsti-
tute the maintenance operations previously performed by employees repre-
sented by the union, reinstate (with back pay) the employees terminated as a
result of the employer's subcontracting, and fulfill its statutory duty to bargain
with the union.
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Board's Fibreboard
1126 decision. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren the Court held
that subcontracting "is well within the literal meaning of the phrase 'terms and
conditions of employment," 27 and that the particular facts "illustrate the pro-
priety of submitting the dispute to collective negotiation" 28:
The Company's decision to contract out the maintenance work did
not alter the Company's basic operation. The maintenance work still
had to be performed in the plant. No capital investment was con-
templated; the Company merely replaced existing employees with
those of an independent contractor to do the same work under simi-
lar conditions of employment. Therefore, to require the employer to
bargain about the matter would not significantly abridge his freedom
to manage the business.29
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, like the majority opinion, sought to
limit Fibreboard to its facts. Thus, the majority observed that "[o]ur decision
need not and does not encompass other forms of 'contracting' out or 'subcon-
tracting' which arise daily in our complex economy." °3 0 Elaborating on this
point, the concurring opinion, in which Justice Stewart was joined by Justices
Douglas and Harlan, emphasized:
The Court most assuredly does not decide that every managerial de-
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1026. Section 8(a)(3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer. . . [b]y discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
25. The requirement to bargain about the effects, as opposed to the decision, of economically
motivated operational changes has existed since the early years of the Wagner Act.
26. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
27. Id. at 210.
28. Id. at 213.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 215.
1980]
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cision which necessarily terminates an individual's employment is
subject to the duty to bargain. Nor does the Court decide that sub-
contracting decisions are as a general matter subject to that duty.3'
[T]here are other areas where decisions by management may quite
clearly imperil job security, or indeed terminate employment en-
tirely. An enterprise may decide to invest in labor-saving machinery.
Another may resolve to liquidate its assets and go out of business.
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a
duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions,
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concern-
ing the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the
enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of em-
ployment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to ter-
minate employment. If. . . the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a
limited area subject to the duty of collective bargaining, those man-
agement decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a
corporate enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employ-
ment security should be excluded from the area.32
B. The Duty To Bargain in Light of the Supreme Court's Darlington
Decision
Unlike Fibreboard, which involved section 8(a)(5) in the context of a
well-established bargaining relationship, Darlington33 arose under section
8(a)(3) 34 in the course of a union's drive to organize the employees at one of
the employer's plants. Because of its section 8(a)(5) implications, however, the
Darlington case warrants more than passing consideration.
In 1956 the Textile Workers commenced organizational activity among
the Darlington mill employees. The employer responded in various ways, in-
cluding alleged threats to close if the union was successful in an NLRB elec-
tion. When the union won the election, Darlington closed the mill in
November 1956 and sold all the plant's machinery and equipment a month
later. The union countered by filing an unfair labor practice charge alleging
violations of sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Board found that Darlington was part of a single integrated enter-
prise, Deering Milliken, and that by closing a part of its operation in response
to the union's victory in the election, Deering Milliken had violated sections
8(a)(1), (3), and (5).35 The Fourth Circuit, however, assuming without decid-
ing the Board's single-employer finding, held that an employer had an abso-
lute right to close all or part of its business regardless of motivation.3 6
31. Id. at 218 (Stewart, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
33. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1963).
34. See note 24 supra.
35. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962), enforcement denied, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.
1963).
36. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
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Before the Supreme Court the union-but not the Board 37-contended
that an employer who goes completely out of business to avoid unionization
violates the Act. Rejecting the union's argument, the Court observed: "A
proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he
wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be en-
tertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal
judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act. We find neither."38
Although agreeing with the court of appeals that an independent em-
ployer's liquidation of its business is not an unfair labor practice, the Supreme
Court rejected the court of appeal's view that the same result follows even if,
as contended by the Board, "Darlington is regarded as an integral part of the
Deering Milliken enterprise":
The closing of an entire business, even though discriminatory,
ends the employer-employee relationship; the force of such a closing
is entirely spent as to that business when termination of the enter-
prise takes place. On the other hand, a discriminatory partial closing
may have repercussions on what remains of the business, affording
employer leverage for discouraging the free exercise of § 7 rights
among remaining employees of much the same kind as that found to
exist in the "runaway shop"39 and "temporary closing" cases. More-
over, a possible remedy open to the Board in such a case, like the
remedies available in the 'runaway shop' and 'temporary closing'
cases, is to order reinstatement of the discharged employees in the
other parts of the business. No such remedy is available when an
entire business has been terminated. By analogy to those cases in-
volving a continuing enterprise we are constrained to hold, in disa-
greement with the Court of Appeals, that a partial closing is an
unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) if motivated by a purpose to
chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of the single employer
and if the employer may reasonably have foreseen that such closing
will likely have that effect.4°
The Board had also found a section 8(a)(5) violation in Dzrlington. This
finding, however, was based partially on the discriminatory.closing of the mill.
Therefore, Darlington did not squarely present to the Court the question
whether section 8(a)(5) "requires an employer to bargain concerning a purely
business decision to terminate his enterprise." 41
37. The Board's argument rested on the integrated nature of the operation, so that the closing
of the Darlington mill represented a partial, rather than a complete, closing. See Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 265-70.
38. 380 U.S. at 270.
39. See note 11 supra.
40. 380 U.S. at 274-75 (footnote omitted). The Court remanded the case to the Board for
further findings on "the purpose and effect of the closing with respect to the employees in the
other plants comprising the Deering Milliken group." Id. at 276-77.
41. Id. at 267 n.5. Darlington maintained throughout that the plant was closed entirely for
economic reasons. See, eg., 139 N.L.R.B. at 245.
After all these years, the case was recently settled. See [1980] 1 LAB. R '. (BNA) (105 News
& Backgrd. Info.) 320. By a vote of 472 to 8, the former Darlington workers accepted an offer of
19801
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C Post-Fibreboard Developments
Long before Town & Country and Fibreboard it was well settled that
changes in business operations required bargaining about the effects, if not the
decision to undertake the changes. With the Supreme Court's affirmation of
Fibreboard, the decision to make the changes was no longer the exclusive pre-
rogative of management. The Fibreboard rationale, however, contained a
potential flaw. Both the majority and concurring opinions in Fibreboard
sought to limit the decision to subcontracting and to the particular facts in-
volved. Management and labor, nevertheless, viewed Fibreboard as having
far-reaching implications. They both foresaw an expansion of the area about
which an employer must bargain. Thus, notwithstanding the Board's assur-
ances that Fibreboard did not obligate an employer to "yield to a union's de-
mand" or arrive at a decision "inconsistent with management's business
judgment," the overall response of employers to the Fibreboard decision was
one of dismay.42 On the other hand, unions, which had long wished for a
greater voice in determining the destiny of their membership, looked at
Fibreboard with "joyful expectations. 43
An overview of the seventeen years since Fibreboard suggests that neither
the fears of management nor the expectations of labor have come to pass.
While decision-bargaining has been extended to a variety of business changes
other than the subcontracting involved in Fibreboard, the Board has also ex-
empted certain business decisions from the obligation to bargain. As a result
of judicial reluctance to extend bargaining much beyond the subcontracting
parameters of Fibreboard, combined with the Board's difficulty in fashioning
fully effective remedies, the predictions (or expectations) of neither employers
nor unions have come true.
After finally arriving at a decision it had been so long reluctant to make,
the Board quickly dispelled any notion of a narrow interpretation of
Fibreboard. From the contracting out in Fibreboard, decision-bargaining was
extended in relatively short order to include a variety of operational decisions
that, if implemented, would eliminate bargaining unit work. Employer deci-
sions to automate portions of its operations," to rely on independent contrac-
tors,45 to sell a part of a business, 46 to lease a portion of the operations, 47 to
relocate or consolidate,48 and to terminate operations-both partially49 and
$5 million in back pay. Id. The settlement had been proposed by the NLRB and agreed to by
Milliken. Id.
42. Farmer, Good Faith Bargaining Over Subcontracting, 51 GEo. L.J. 558, 576 (1963).
43. Zeman, The Aftermath of Fibreboard: The Cooling Off Period, PRoc. OF N.Y. U. NINE-
TEENTH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 413 (1967).
44. Richland, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 91 (1969); Northwestern Publishing Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1069
(1963), enforced, 343 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1965); Renton News Record, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1294
(1962).
45. Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforcement denied, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
46. Weingarten Food Center of Tenn., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 256 (1962).
47. Schnell Tool & Die Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1967).
48. Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15 (1965).
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completely5° -were brought under the Fibreboard umbrella.
1. Plant Relocation and Partial Closures
Although conceptually distinguishable, there is little practical difference
between plant relocation and closure.51 "From the point of view of the union,
both result in termination of employment; from management's point of view,
both are operational changes." 52 Since the Board and the courts have applied
the principles of Fibreboard and Darlington to both employer actions (albeit
with different results), the difference between relocation and partial closure
may have little legal significance as well. In circumstances in which the same
considerations are involved for analytical purposes, there is no apparent rea-
son to view relocation and closure separately.
53
Consistent with its expansive views of the obligation to bargain on opera-
tional changes in general, the Board has applied the principles of Fibreboard
to plant relocations and closures. Unlike relocations, the Board has had to
consider closure cases, whether partial or complete, in light of the Darlington
decision. 54 In Darlington the Supreme Court, observed that "when an em-
ployer closes his entire business, even if the liquidation is motivated by vindic-
tiveness toward the union, such action is not an unfair labor practice. '55
Although Darlington inv olved a section 8(a)(3) violation and the section
8(a)(5) issue was not presented to the Court, the Supreme Court's words have
been interpreted by some lower courts as excluding both partial and total clos-
ings as outside the ambit of section 8(a)(5). 56
The Board's general rule is that Darlington is not applicable to section
49. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966); Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148
N.L.R.B. 545 (1964).
50. Star Baby Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678, 681 (1963), enforced as modfled, 334 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.
1964).
51. Relocation usually implies a continued need for the work; closure normally means an
employer is abandoning a portion of the business.
52. Schwarz, Plant Relocation or Partial Termination-The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39
FORDHAM L. REv. 81, 87 n.36 (1970).
53. Both relocation and closure are terms of art that have no precise legal meaning. In relo-
cation, essentially identical jobs are available at the new site and employees of the old facility are
normally discharged. Relocation includes three distinct categories: (1) an employer abandons an
existing plant and transfers the entire business to a new location, see, e.g., McLoughlin Mfg.
Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 958, 74 L.R.R.M. 1756 (1970), enforced, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972); (2) a
particular operation is transferred to a new facility while continuing other operations at the old
location, see, e.g., Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954); (3) a multiplant
employer simply transfers production contracts from one plant to another, see, e.g., Industrial
Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162 (1957).
A partial or complete closure can also occur in these same contexts, with the primary distinc-
tion being that closure results in the jobs disappearing, while they still exist in relocation situa-
tions. Although indistinguishable in some respects, the difference between relocation and closure
is important when it comes to fashioning remedies for violations. For a detailed discussion of
relocation and closure, see SwiFr, NLRB AND MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING 43-78 (1974).
54. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
55. Id. at 273-74.
56. See, eg., Morrison Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970), in which the
Eighth Circuit held that it would find a § 8(a)(5) violation in partial or total closing situations only
when the employer has also violated § 8(a)(3).
1980]
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8(a)(5) situations. Thus, in the Royal Plating case 57 the Board stated:
We perceive nothing in that portion of the Darlington decision deal-
ing with the discriminatory partial closing of a business which war-
rants withholding application of the Act's collective-bargaining
provisions to Respondent's decision to close down the Bleeker Street
plant.
Plainly, Respondent's decision to close down. . and the Union's
efforts to bargain concerning that decision and its impact on employ-
ees related to employees' 'terms and conditions of employment.'..
The fact that the decision was based on economic considerations
made it particularly amenable to the procedures of collective bar-
gaining. For under such procedures, the Respondent would not have
surrendered its managerial right to run its business and to take those
steps which its business judgment satisfied it were necessary. All that
was required here was that Respondent bargain in goodfaith about the
termination of the Bleeker Street plant with its employees' bargaining
representative to give its employees an opportunity to persuade it to
achieve similar economies through negotiation of an acceptable al-
ternative.58
In Ozark Trailers, Inc. 59 the Board reiterated these views and also re-
jected the strict approach taken by several courts of appeal in applying
Fibreboard to operational changes other than subcontracting. In Ozark the
employer, without notifying or consulting with the union, closed a division of
its operations that manufactured truck bodies. The Board found a violation in
both the employer's failure to bargain about the decision as well as its effects.
Commenting on the impact of Darlington, the Board stated:
We perceive nothing in that portion of the Darlington decision deal-
ing with the discriminatory partial closing of a business which sug-
gests the inapplicability of the collective-bargaining requirement of
the Act to Respondents' decision to close down the Ozark plant. In-
deed, as the Darlington decision affirms the propriety of the applica-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) to a partial closing of a business, it would be
anomalous to find that Section 8(a)(5) is without governing authority
in such situations. We therefore find that the Darlington decision
does not require dismissal of the complaints and that the question of
whether the Respondents violated the Act in unilaterally determining
to close down the Ozark plant must be decided in the light of consid-
erations set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in the Fibreboard
case.
60
In response to the judiciary's restrictive interpretation of Fibreboard,6t
57. Royal Plating and Polishing Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 619 (1965).
58. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
59. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
60. Id. at 565.
61. The narrow reading of Fibreboard by some reviewing courts is clearly gleaned from the
Fibreboard majority's limitation of the decision to its facts and Justice Stewart's concurring opin-
ion, which suggested that no bargaining is required when "entrepreneurial questions as what shall
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the Board rejected the argument that the obligation to bargain turns on the
financial significance or the importance of the operational change:
With all respect to the Court of Appeals for the Third and Eighth
Circuit, we do not believe that the question whether a particular
management decision must be bargained about should turn on
whether the decision involves the commitment of investment capital,
or on whether it may be characterized as involving 'major' or 'basic'
change in the nature of the employer's business. True it is that deci-
sions of this nature are, by definition, of significance for the em-
ployer. It is equally true, however, and ought not be lost sight of,
that an employer's decision to make a 'major' change in the nature of
his business, such as the termination of a portion thereof, is also of
significance for those employees whose jobs will be lost by the termi-
nation. For, just as the employer has invested capital in the business,
so the employee has invested years of his working life, accumulating
seniority, accruing pension rights, and developing skills that may or
may not be salable to another employer. And, just as the employer's
interest in the protection of his capital investment is entitled to con-
sideration in our interpretation of the Act, so too is the employee's
interest in the protection of his livelihood.
In short, we see no reason why employees should be denied the right
to bargain about a decision directly affecting terms and conditions of
employment which is of profound significance for them solely be-
cause that decision is also a significant one for management. 62
In the Board's view, a decision to terminate a portion of an operation, "just as
contracting out, is a problem of vital concern to both labor and management,
and it would promote the fundamental purpose of the [National Labor Rela-
tions] Act to bring that problem within the collective-bargaining framework
set out in the Act. ' 63
What the Board had to say about the application of Fibreboard to partial
closures is equally relevant to plant relocations, 64 as the Board quickly made
clear after Fibreboard II was decided in 1962.65 Thus, the Fibreboard princi-
ples were applied to a can manufacturing company's decision to "move the 2
be produced, how capital shall be invested in fixed assets, or what the basic scope of the enterprise
shall be" are involved. 379 U.S. at 225 (Stewart, J., concurring).
62. 161 N.L.R.B. at 566-67.
63. Id. at 567.
64. Although the emphasis on Fibreboard suggests that decision-bargaining in relocation sit-
uations began with this landmark case, Fibreboard was really the culmination of a dispute going
back to 1941. See Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941), enforced as modledper curiain,
137 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1942) (failure to bargain about decision to relocate violative of § 8(5)). See
also California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952). Compare, however, Brown
Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953), in which the Board seemed to limit relocation
bargaining to the effects of the decision. For a detailed discussion of pre-Fibreboard decisions on
this point, see Duty to Bargain; Subcontracting, Relocation, and Partial Termination, 55 GEO. L.J.
879, 901-07 (1967).
65. See International Shoe Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 693 (1965); Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 305
(1964); R.C. Can Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 210 (1963).
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" line from Arlington to Denison, Texas, 66 the relocation of a handkerchief
manufacturing company from New York City to Amsterdam, New York,67 a
freight agent's closing of its Los Angeles terminal and reopening in Long
Beach,6 8 an employer's closing of its plant in New York and the removal of its
operations to Florida,69 and various other relocations.
70
Ozark Trailers leaves little room for doubt that Fibreboard, at least in the
Board's view, is equally applicable to partial closings and relocations and that,
again, as far as the Board is concerned, the obligation to bargain is not affected
by a "basic" change in a business or a management decision to reconvert or
reinvest funds. Five years later, however, the Board's decision in General Mo-
tors Corp. 71 led some observers to conclude that Ozark Trailers had been
overruled.72
GeneralMotors involved an economically based decision to dispose of an
independent dealership. Rejecting a Trial Examiner's conclusion that the
transaction was similar to subcontracting, and therefore governed by the prin-
ciples of Fibreboard, a sharply divided Board concluded that the transaction
"was in essence a sale."'73 Without any reference to Ozark Trailers the major-
ity held:
[T]his issue is controlled by the rationale the courts have generally
adopted in closely related cases, that decisions such as this, in which
a significant investment or withdrawal of capital will affect the scope
and ultimate direction of an enterprise, are matters essentially
financial and managerial in nature. They thus lie at the very core of
entrepreneurial control and are not the types of subjects which Con-
gress intended to encompass within 'rates of pay, wages, hours or
employment, or other conditions of employment.' Such managerial
decisions ofttimes require secrecy as well as the freedom to act quick-
ly and decisively. They also involve subject areas as to which the
determinative financial and operational considerations are likely to
be unfamiliar to the employees and their representatives.
74
Summit Tooling Co. 75 seemed to signal a further retreat from the expan-
sive principles of Ozark Trailers. Although recognizing that the case might be
66. R.C. Can Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 210 (1963).
67. Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15 (1965).
68. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 998 (1968).
69. Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965), enforced as modfled, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.)
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
70. See P.B. Mutrie Motor Transp., 226 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1976); American Needle & Novelty
Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 534 (1973); Royal Norton Mfg. Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 489 (1971).
71. 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971).
72. See, e.g., Rabin, The Decline and Fall of Fibreboard, N.Y. U. CONF. ON LAB. See also the
Third Circuit's discussion of this point in Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720,
724-30 n.66 (3d Cir. 1978).
73. 191 N.L.R.B. at 951.
74. Id. at 952. The dissenting members of the Board contended that the majority had
adopted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard and the decisions of several courts of
appeal that had denied enforcement of Board decisions applying Fibreboard. They would have
relied on Ozark Trailers to find a violation.
75. 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972).
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viewed as a partial plant closing, the Board held that "its practical effect was to
take the Respondent out of the business of manufacturing tool and tooling
products."' 76 Citing Darlington,77 the practical effects of respondent's closing
"was to eliminate itself as an employer."78 Concluding that a requirement to
bargain about a decision to close out its manufacturing operation would "sig-
nificantly abridge Respondent's freedom to manage its own affairs," the ma-
jority found no violation in the employer's unilateral decision to close its
manufacturing operations.
79
In Royal Typewriter Co.,80 however, another partial closing case, the
Board distinguished General Motors on the basis that GeneralMotors involved
"an economic decision to sell,"8 I and without reconciling the possible conflict-
ing approaches, simply stated that General Motors did not overrule Ozark
Trailers .82
2. Summary of Post-Fibreboard Developments
Until Fibreboard II in 1962 the NLRB had generally held that an em-
ployer had no obligation under section 8(a)(5) to bargain with a union about
the decision to make economically motivated changes in the operation of its
business. Only when the operational changes were (1) discriminatorily moti-
vated under section 8(a)(3) or (2) part of an unlawful scheme to avoid dealing
with the union did the Board find a violation of section 8(a)(5). In theory, at
least, Fibreboard significantly expanded the bargaining obligation, and the ra-
tionale of Fibreboard was steadily extended from the subcontracting involved
in that case to a variety of other operational changes that heretofore had been
the exclusive prerogative of management. Regardless of whether General Mo-
tors represents a Board retreat in this area, the impact of Fibreboard has been
effectively muted by the courts.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO FIBREBO.ARD
At the risk of oversimplification, the response of the judiciary to
Fibreboard can be summed up in a single word: unfriendly. The courts gen-
erally, but not uniformly, have rejected Board attempts to extend decision-
76. Id. at 480.
77. Since the Board also found that the employer's action was discriminatorily motivated,
Summit Tooling did not pose the issue left open by Darlington, ie., whether an employer who
chooses to go out of business entirely for economic reasons might be liable for an unfair labor
practice under § 8(a)(5). In the only total shutdown case the Board, in dictum, held that the
decision to go out of business entirely "is completely within the prerogative of the Employer."
See Merryweather Optical Co., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (March 6, 1979); note 96, infra. See also
Electrical Prods. Div. of Midland-Ross Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 323 (1978); Stagg Zipper Corp., 222
N.L.R.B. 1249 (1976).
78. 195 N.L.R.B. at 480.
79. Id. at 480. As in General Motors, the dissent argued that this case was controlled by
Ozark Trailers.
80. 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974).
81. Id. at 1012 (emphasis omitted).
82. Id. See also Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 729 n.66 (3d Cir.
1978); note 96 infra.
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bargaining to operational changes other than to factual situations similar to
the subcontracting involved in Fibreboard. Thus, at least five circuits-the
third,8 3 sixth,8 4 eighth,8 5 ninth,8 6 and tenth87 -have rejected the Board's ap-
plication of Fibreboard to nonsubcontracting changes, particularly partial
closings. Of the other courts that have spoken definitively on this subject, only
the Fifth Circuit,8 8 and possibly the D.C. Circuit8 9 and the Second Circuit,90
have been receptive to the Board's post-Fibreboard decisions.
The disagreement between the Board and the courts in this area reflects
the courts' adoption of limiting language in Fibreboard, particularly the con-
curring opinion of Justice Stewart with its exclusion from the bargaining obli-
gation of decisions involving "the commitment of investment capital" or "the
basic direction of a corporate enterprise." 9' The Board responded to the judi-
ciary's rebuff in Ozark Trailers,92 setting forth its views on the application of
Fibreboard to partial terminations. Rejecting the idea that the obligation to
bargain does not arise when a "major" or "basic" change or the "commitment
83. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965) (No obligation to
bargain about decision to close one of two plants when, prior to determination to close, employer
had suffered "severe" economic losses for several years and property on which closed plant was
located had been designated to be "redeveloped," so that there was "no room for negotiation.")
But see Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 734-39 (3d Cir. 1978) (clarifying
RoyalPlating in propounding "an initial presumption.., that a partial closing is a mandatory
subject of bargaining" and in fashioning a balancing analysis weighing employer and employee
interests in bargaining to determine whether the presumption has in fact been rebutted). See gen.
erally, Comment, Duty to Bargain About Termination ofOperations, Brockway Motor Trucks v.
NLRB, 92 HARv. L. REv. 768 (1979).
84. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prods., 439 F.2d 40,42 (6th Cir. 1971) (In finding no obligation to
bargain over the decision to move work of one unit to another unit, the court held that the "broad
implications of Fibreboard which the Board attempts to impose.., are ill founded." Cf. Wel-
tronic Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970) (Because the
transfer of a job to a new plant three miles away ha a significant impact on terms of employment,
the transfernng company has a statutory duty to give the union an opportunity to bargain.).
85. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011
(1966) (Termination of milk distribution system constituted a "basic operational change" after
which, unlike Fibreboard, employer retained no control over independent contractor's perform-
ance of milk distribution; negotiations had occurred before contract came into effect.).
86. NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1967) (Move of
shipbuilding facilities to new location not a mandatory subject of bargaining when evidence indi-
cated that employer was in danger "of becoming unable to serve adequately its principal cus-
tomer.").
87. NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Cir. 1969) (No obligation to
bargain over closing of a terminal when evidence indicated that employer had lost the "major
part" of its business and relocation involved a major commitment of capital and a fundamental
alteration of the corporate enterprise.)
88. See NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935
(1966) (decision to discontinue cheese cutting and packing at the employer's warehouse held to be
a mandator subject of bargaining). See also NLRB v. W.R. Grace & Co., 571 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.
1978) (employer must bargain over decision to discontinue part of the production process); NLRB
v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965) (duty to bargain before subcontracting work
previously done by motor truck transportation department).
89. Garment Workers v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
90. NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80-544) (Establishing "rebuttal presumption"
of duty to bargain in partial closing context that employer's can overcome "by showing that the
purposes of the statute would not be furthered by imposition of a duty to bargain").
91. 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
92. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
[Vol. 59
PLANT RELOCA4TION
of investment capital" is involved, the Board held that Fibreboard is equally
applicable to partial closings and than an employer must discuss the decision
to close as well as its impact.93 The Eighth Circuit was unimpressed. It has
repeatedly refused to adopt the Board's views, holding instead that "[a]bsent
union animus, a company has no legal duty to bargain with a union over the
decision to partially shut down its operations because of economic reasons."'94
In essence, except for GeneralMotors,95 which the Board has sought to limit,9 6
the Board has adopted a pro-bargaining stance, emphasizing that such deci-
sions fall within the ambit of the "terms and conditions of employment." The
judiciary, however, fastening on the limiting language of Justice Stewart's con-
curring opinion, usually, but not invariably, has come down on the side of
management.
The Supreme Court may soon resolve this dispute between the Board and
the courts. The Court recently agreed to review a decision of the Second Cir-
cuit in which the court of appeals split the difference between the Board and
the courts. Following the lead of the Third Circuit, 97 the court in NLRB v.
First National Maintenance Corp. 98 held that there is a rebuttable presumption
under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA that an employer is under a duty to bargain
about a partial closing of its operations.99 Rejecting, however, what it charac-
terized as the Third Circuit's "balancing of the respective interests of the em-
ployer and employees in bargaining" 1 as the "determinative factor" in
assessing whether the presumption has in fact been rebutted, the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that the appropriate analysis should center around a "showing
93. Id. at 566.
94. Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Morrison
Cafeterias Consol., Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425
F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1970). The Board has had better success persuading the courts to apply
Fibreboard to plant relocations rather than to partial closings. See, e.g., NLRB v. Plymouth In-
dus., Inc., 435 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), in which the Sixth Circuit required decision-
bargaining over the transfer of work from a plant in Warren, Michigan, to a facility in Ithaca,
Michigan; Weltronic Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1969), in
which the same court enforced the Board's order requiring bargaining about the employer's deci-
sion to relocate from Peru, Indiana, to Uniontown, Alabama. Compare, however, NLRB v. Acme
Indus. Prods., Inc., 439 F.2d 40, 43 (6th Cir. 1971), in which the Sixth Circuit held that the em-
ployer "had no obligation to negotiate with regard to its decision to move the standard production
unit to another plant."
95. General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971).
96. Subsequent Board decisions have distinguished General Motors, so that General Motors
may be a case without a doctrine. See, e.g., International Harvester Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 712 (1978);
Royal Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974). The only case in which it might be argued that
General Motors was followed is Merryweather Optical Co., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (March 6,
1979). In that case, however, the failure to discuss the decision to close completely was not alleged
as a violation, and the Board, in dictum, cited General-Motors as authority for the general proposi-
tion that a decision to close that involves "'significant investment or withdrawl of capital'" that
"'affect[s] the scope and ultimate direction of the enterprise'" is completely within the prerogative
of the employer. 1d. at 6.
97- See Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 734-39 (3d Cir. 1978); note 83
supra.
98. 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80-
544).
99. Id. at 601-02.
100. Id. at 601.
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that the purposes of the statute would not be furthered by the imposition of a
duty to bargain."110' In dissent, Judge Kearse adhered to the generally prevail-
ing view in the circuit courts102 and argued that the decision to close a
financially-troubled operation is "a matter of fundamental entrepreneurial
discretion" about which an employer is not required to bargain under
Fibreboard and its progeny.10 3 If the Court follows the lead of Judge Kearse's
dissent and renders an unequivocal ruling that an employer need not bargain
about a partial closing under any circumstances, the tenor of labor-manage-
ment relations in many contexts will be fundamentally altered.
IV. FIBPEBOARD REMEDIES
If court resistance has been a problem, the inability to fashion fully effec-
tive remedies has further inhibited the development of Fibreboard. Fashion-
ing effective remedies, however, transcends Fibreboard-type cases. Therefore,
this problem should be examined in light of the Board's overall experience in
this area.
Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act'°4 has been construed
as vesting the Board with broad discretion to remedy unfair labor practices.
This discretion, however, is not unfettered. The major limitation placed on
the Board's discretion is that the remedies devised by the Board must be remne-
dial, not punitive*105 The remedial/punitive dichotomy arose during the early
years of the Act's enforcement, culminating with the Supreme Court's decision
in the Republic Steel case.' 0 6 In articulating the distinction, the Court said
that the language in section 10(c):
should be construed in harmony with the spirit and remedial pur-
poses of the Act. We do not think that Congress intended to vest in
101. Id. The distinction between the two circuit courts may be more semantic than real. For
example, the Third Circuit in Brockway Motor Trucks pointed out that one factor that would
demonstrate the utility of bargaining is "the frequency with which parties to labor-management
contracts include clauses in their agreements bearing on such a matter." 582 F.2d at 737. The
Second Circuit in First NatY!Maintenance Corp. noted as well that "the custom of the industry" to
bargain about a partial closing would be a salient factor in its analysis. 627 F.2d at 601-02. And,
in suggesting that an employer need not bargain "when it is clear that the employer's decision
cannot be changed," id. at 601, the Second Circuit in essence is using a variant of the Third
Circuit's analysis that "weigh[s] the competing interests of the employer against those of the em-
ployees." 582 F.2d at 733. More specifically, in such a setting, the employer's right to control the
destiny of his business outweighs the interests of the employees in altering "the prospect of losing
theirjobs." Id. at 735. In short, the similarity ofthe two courts in rejecting a per se rule to resolve
the partial closing problem and in establishing a multi-faceted approach that analyzes all the facts
and circumstances and that places the burden on the employer to explain a refusal to bargain is
far more significant than the differences between the two decisions.
102. See notes 83-87 supra.
103. 627 F.2d at 605 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
104. Upon a finding that an employer or union is engaging in an unfair labor practice, § 10(c)
authorizes the Board to issue a "cease and desist order" and to "take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
the Act ...." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
105. The Act contains no express penalties for violating its provisions, and only when a re-
spondent employer or union is held to be in contempt (a finding made by a court, not the Board) is
there any possibility of fines or incarceration.
106. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
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the Board a virtually unlimited discretion to devise punitive meas-
ures, and thus to prescribe penalties or fines which the Board may
think would effectuate the policies of the Act. 07
Thus, whenever possible the Board's remedial efforts are designed to re-
store the status quo--to return employees to the position that existed before
the rights were violated. As long as the relief ordered is intended to "make
someone whole who has been deprived of a recognized interest by acts that
constitute a violation of the Act and/or. . . to prevent the violator from bene-
fiting by his misdeed," the Board's order should stand.' 0 8
The Board's customary remedy for employees discharged in violation of
section 8(a)(3) calls for an offer of reinstatement and back pay for wages lost
as a result of discrimination. 0 9 In the typical section 8(a)(3) case the em-
ployer is still in business and the job from which the employee was discharged
is still being performed. Therefore, the Board's order requiring an offer of
reinstatement and back pay imposes no undue burden upon the employer.
Under these circumstances the reinstatement and back pay remedy has been
uniformly approved by reviewing courts."10
A different situation is presented, however, when for one reason or an-
other the employer has moved or permanently abolished the operations for-
merly performed by the unlawfully discharged employees. The classic case of
this type is the so-called "runaway shop," in which an employer closes down
one facility and moves to another location in order to avoid its obligations
toward a union or to penalize the employees for having selected a union."'
Even when the unlawful relocation is near the original facility, the Board's
normal remedy is limited to an offer of reinstatement, back pay, and moving
expenses. The Board generally has not ordered an employer to resume opera-
tions at the old location if that facility was completely closed."t 2 To remedy
the section 8(a)(5) violation in runaway shop situations, the Board customarily
gives an employer the option of returning to the original location, in which
case the payment of moving expenses to employees who accept offers of rein-
statement is obviated. This remedy is applied only when the new plant is lo-
107. Id. at 1 I.
108. NLRB v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 241 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1957).
109. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1187 (1978); Cabana Motel, 222 N.L.R.B.
394, 395 (1976); F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289,.291-94 (1950).
110. See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 175-77 (1973); NLRB v.
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 262-66 (1969); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375,
380-81 (1967); NLRB v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 591 F.2d 566, 570-73 (10th Cir. 1979); NLRB
v. Interurban Gas Co., 354 F.2d 76, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1965).
111. See, eg., Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965), enforced as modpfed, 374 F.2d 295
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 980 (1969); Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961),
enforced per curiam, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962).
112. Cf. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 1374-77 (1954) (Member Mur-
dock dissenting) (failure to require presumption of terminal operations allows unfair labor prac-
tices to remain unremedied). Compare, however, Gibraltar Indus., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 798, 819
(1978), in which the Board adopted an administrative law judge's remedy ordering the employer
to return operations from Brooklyn, New York, to the closed plant in Kentucky because restora-
tion would be "relatively simple" since the employer still had a lease on the old facility.
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cated some distance from the old location.' t3 When the new facility is near
the old one, the Board assumes that a majority of the employees would have
transferred had they been afforded an opportunity, and orders bargaining.'t 4
As might be expected, those employers whose primary motivation in relo-
cating is to admittedly avoid bargaining more often than not opt not to return
to the old location, especially since experience shows that few employees are
likely to accept an offer of reinstatement to transfer to the new facility. The
Board has attempted to remedy this by ordering the runaway employer to rec-
ognize and bargain with the union irrespective of the union's majority status.
The courts, however, have denied enforcement," t5 finding that the Board's
remedy seeks "to 'punish' the Employer by means which invade guaranteed
rights of [the new] workers and fail. . . to accord freedom of choice its proper
place."16
The Board's efforts to remedy runaway shop situations-by and large un-
successful-provide an illuminating and perhaps prophetic backdrop against
which to view Board attempts to fashion effective remedies for Fibreboard and
its progeny. For if the Board has been unable to devise remedies that would
pass court muster when the loss ofjobs results from discriminatorily motivated
acts under section 8(a)(3), prospects of favorable response from the courts
when the job losses result from economically motivated operational changes
are predictably dim. 1 7
The touchstone for remedies in Fibreboard situations, as it is for all unfair
labor practice cases, is the restoration of the status quo." l8 This principle is
not mechanically applied, however, and may be tempered if complete restora-
tion would impose an unfair or undue burden on the employer or if such rem-
edy would endanger the employer's viability."19 As this has been a
consideration when the adverse impact on employees is discriminatorily moti-
vated, it is a fortiori an obvious factor when the loss of unit jobs results from
operational changes motivated by purely economic reasons.120
113. See Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547, 555-56 (1961), enforcedper cur/am, 305 F.2d
825 (3d Cir. 1962).
114. Hurley Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 551, enforced, 310 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1962); Royal Optical Mfg.
Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 64 (1962); Royal Oak Tool & Mach. Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1361 (1961), enforced,
320 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1967); California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955).
115. Cooper Thermometer Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1967); Local 57, Int'l Ladies
Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967). For a
perceptive discussion of the problem of remedies in runaway shop situations, see Kramer, NLRB
Remedies for the Runaway Shop: Loopholes in the National Labor Policy, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 649.
116. Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 302,
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
117. Perhaps further casting a shadow over Board efforts to provide effective remedies for
unfair labor practices is H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), in which the Supreme
Court held that notwithstanding the employer's bad faith bargaining, the Board lacked the power
to compel an employer to grant the union a dues checkoff clause when the employer had refused
to agree to such a clause in the course of bargaining.
118. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 555 (1962) (Fibreboard II).
119. The difficulty and impracticality of requiring an employer to resume operations has been
recognized by the Board in runaway shop situations. See Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664 (1965),
enforced as modjed, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
120. R & H Masonry Supply, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (Sept. 29, 1978); Renton News Rec-
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This is particularly true for economically motivated operational changes
consisting of partial closures and relocations. Viewed against the above back-
ground, examination of remedies devised by the Board in post-Fibreboard de-
cisions discloses that the relief ordered has paralleled remedial action in
section 8(a)(3) cases, but tailored to reflect that these cases involve the obliga-
tions to bargain under section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
In Fibreboard the Board sought restoration of the status quo by ordering
the employer to abrogate the subcontract and reinstate the terminated employ-
ees with back pay. The Board, noting that the maintenance operation was still
being performed essentially as it was before the subcontracting, that the em-
ployer continued to need the service, and that the subcontract was terminable
at will upon sixty days' notice, concluded that restoration would not impose
"an undue and unfair burden" on the employer. Neither the D.C. Circuit nor
the Supreme Court had any problems with the Board's remedy, notwithstand-
ing the employer's contention that reinstatement was improper because under
section 10(c) the Board's authority is limited to reinstating employees who
have been unlawfully discharged.
In factual situations similar to Fibreboard, namely those in which (1) the
impact on the bargaining unit results from subcontracting, (2) the employer
still needs the work in question, and (3) no undue hardship would be imposed,
the Board has ordered termination of the subcontract and resumption of oper-
ations.'2 1 However, for other operational changes, including relocations and
partial closings, the Board, with reason, has been reluctant to order the re-
sumption of operations. Indeed, although contending that it has the power to
do so, the Board has rarely ordered an employer to return a plant to its origi-
nal location, even when the relocation of the plant was discriminatorily moti-
vated under section 8(a)(3).
Notwithstanding its theoretical arsenal of weapons, the Board-respond-
ing perhaps to the judiciary's refusal to enforce its decisions-has recognized
that in many instances it simply is impracticable, if not impossible, to restore
completely the status quo.' 22 Nevertheless, the Board has recognized that
something more than a simple order to bargain is necessary if bargaining is to
be more than an "exercise in futility." Since the union in these situations has
been presented with afait accompli, the Board has developed what has come
to be known as the Van's Packing formula. 123
ord, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962). Cf. Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1670 (1977)
(when reopening unprofitable plant would be unduly burdensome, employer must pay employees
who were discriminatorily terminated for loss of pay from termination until another job is se-
cured.).
121. Equitable Gas Co., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (Sept. 24, 1979); AMCAR Div., ACF Indus., 231
N.L.R.B. 83 (1977).
122. In a case that involved § 8(a)(3) violations as well as the failure to bargain over the deci-
sion and effects of the transfer of work to another state shortly after the union won an election, the
Board ordered resumption of the operation at the closed plant. Resumption was "relatively sim-
ple," however, because the old facility was still leased by the employer. Gibraltar Indus. Inc., 237
N.L.R.B. 798, 819 (1978).
123. Van's Packing Plant, 211 N.L.R.B. 692 (1974). This remedy was first formulated in 1968.
See Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389 (1968).
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The underlying rationale of the Van's Packing formula is that the affected
employees have been denied the services of their union when the employer
still needs the services of the employees, so that a "measure of balanced bar-
gaining power exist[s]." Recognizing that complete restoration of the status
quo is not possible, the Board seeks to restore "some measure of economic
strength to the union" by accompanying the bargaining order with a "limited
backpay requirement." The back pay requirement has a two-fold purpose: (1)
to make the displaced employees whole for losses resulting from the unfair
labor practice; and (2) to "recreate in some practicable manner a situation in
which the parties' bargaining position is not entirely devoid of economic con-
sequences" as far as the employer is concerned. For example, the formula
devised in Van's Packing provided for back pay from five days after the
Board's decision until the occurrence of the earliest of the following condi-
tions:
(1) the date the Respondent bargains to agreement with the Union on
those subjects pertaining to the effects of the plant shutdown on its
employees; (2) a bona fide impasse in bargaining; (3) the failure of
the Union to request bargaining within 5 days of this Decision, or
commence negotiations within 5 days of the Respondent's notice of
its desire to bargain with the Union; or (4) the subsequent failure of
the Union to bargain in good faith; but in no event shall the sum
paid to any of these employees exceed the amount he would have
earned as wages from March 23, 1973, the date on which the Respon-
dent terminated its wholesale slaughtering operations, to the time he
secured equivalent employment elsewhere, or the date on which the
Respondent shall have offered to bargain, whichever occurs sooner;
provided, however, thit in no event shall this sum be less than these
employees would have earned for a 2-week period at the rate of their
normal wages when last in the Respondent's employ. 124
The Board is also making greater use of its authority to seek injunctive
relief under section 10(j) of the Act. 125 While remedies under section 10(c) are
designed to restore the status quo, section 10(j) injunctive relief seeks to main-
tain the status quo so that "the Board's final order, when entered, will not be a
nullity."'126 Such relief also assures "that the remedial purposes of the Act will
not be furthered by the delays inherent in the statutory framework for litiga-
tion." 127 Over the past few years the Board has resorted more frequently to
section 10(j), both generally and with respect to Fibreboard-type operational
changes.128
124. 211 N.L.R.B. at 692.
125. Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act authorizes the Board, "upon issuance
of a complaint... charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor
practice, to petition any District Court of the United States. . . for appropriate temporary relief
or restraining order." 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1976).
126. See J. Irving, GENERAL CouNsEL's REPORT ON UTILIZATION OF 10(J) INJUNCTION PRO-
CEEDINGS JULY 1, 1975, THROUGH JUNE 30, 1979, at 1 [hereinafter cited as GENERAL COUNSEL'S
REPORT].
127. Id.
128. During the four years covered by the GENERAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 126, the
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Section 10(j) is not a panacea, however, and its limitations should be rec-
ognized.' 29 First of all, the commencement of section 10(j) injunction pro-
ceedings requires the Board to demonstrate that its normal remedial processes
will be frustrated absent injunctive relief. This may not always be easy to
demonstrate. More important, to involve the Board's section 10() authority in
Fibreboard-type cases, the union must be aware that the operational change isimminent or pending. If the employer's plans are not known in advance, both
the Board and the Court may be faced with a familiar problem in relocation
situations-the difficulty of undoing thefait accompli. Thus, in potential sec-
tion 10(j) situations, just as in regular litigation, the Board must deal with the
practical problems of fashioning relief that is just but not unduly burdensome.
All of these considerations beg the underlying issue, however, and that is
the courts' refusal to read Fibreboard as expansively as the Board has with
respect to the obligation to decision-bargain over economically motivated op-
erational changes other than subcontracting. If the circuit courts of appeal are
unwilling for whatever reason to enforce Board orders on this point after the
matter has been fully litigated, the chances that federal district courts will ac-
cept the Board's representations after an exparte investigation are at best re-
mote.' 30 It is clear, therefore, that without resolution of the tension between
the Board and the courts in this area, which may come soon in the Supreme
Court, 1 the problem of fashioning effective remedies or, indeed, of resolving
the conflicting interests at all, will continue to exist.
V. FIBR.EBOARD, MNCs, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Until Fibreboard II burst on the scene in 1962, the definition of
mandatory subjects for bargaining within the statutory phrase "other terms
and conditions of employment" was by and large an evolutionary process.
Viewed against the background of its historical antecedents, Fibreboard, with
its potentially sweeping application to a variety of economically motivated de-
cisions heretofore secure within the bastion of "management prerogative,"
seemed more revolutionary than evolutionary. Today, seventeen years after
its affirmation by the U.S. Supreme Court, the controversy that once sur-
rounded Fibreboard has diminished. And, in retrospect, if Fibreboard has not
delivered all that its supporters hoped for, neither has it produced the disas-
trous results its critics predicted.
Board authorized 193 § 10(j) proceedings (an average of approximately 48 per year), 13 of which
involved "subcontracting or other change to avoid bargain obligation." See GENERAL COUNSEL'S
REPORT, supra note 126, Appendix B, at 5-6.
129. This problem was explored by Chairman Murphy's Task Force on the NLRB. See the
TASK FORCE'S INTERIM REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 77-82 (November 5, 1976).
130. Of the 13 Fibreboard-type cases in which § 10(j) relief was authorized during the four
years covered by the GENERAL COUNSE.'s REPORT, supra note 126, 12 included an alleged viola-
tion of§ 8(a)(3). Even in § 8(a)(3) cases, however, in which the courts have been more disposed to
agree with the Board, it has not always been possible to persuade the courts to grant the petitioned
for relief. See GENERAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 126, Appendix B, Situation 3, at 5.
131. See text following note 96 supra.
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If Fibreboard has atrophied since the 1960s, the same cannot be said for
MNCs. Operational changes, including subcontracting, closings, and reloca-
tions, are not new. Until the end of World War II, however, these changes
primarily occurred within the confines of the United States, with a foreign
investment limited to supplying natural resources for U.S.-based facilities.
The emergence of MNCs over the past thirty years, but particularly during the
1960s, is one of the more complex issues on the current industrial relations
scene. The current pre-eminence of MNCs has also created a major foreign
trade problem for the United States-a problem that poses the possibility of
serious economic consequences for the United States, as well as benefits.
MNCs have developed resources in other countries, particularly underdevel-
oped nations, and have raised standards of living throughout the world. But
the accomplishments of MNCs, impressive as they may be, have also raised
serious questions, particularly over the impact of MNCs on U.S. jobs.' 32
Given their traditional adversarial relationship, it is not surprising that
management and labor have divergent views on the desirability of the growth
of MNCs and whether and how MNCs should be regulated.133 Although the
development of Fibreboard coincided with the growth of MNCs during the
1960s, American unions, for whatever reasons, have yet to make any real effort
to bring the activities of MNCs within the ambit of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.' 34 An examination of Fibreboard and its progeny suggests that the
NLRB could well respond favorably to a union's claim that an employer's
decision to relocate to a foreign country is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining within the meaning of section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The judiciary's
response would probably be less favorable. Obviously, the ultimate applica-
tion of the Fibreboard doctrine to MNCs is open to speculation.
If Fibreboard has atrophied, the problems have not.135 Nor are they
readily solvable whether the plant moves to a different location in or outside of
the United States. No one disputes the argument that plant closures and relo-
cations can have a devastating impact on employees. But keeping obsolete
and unproductive plants open is not the solution and could have an equally
devastating effect on both employers and employees. The problems of plant
132. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
133. The possible success of transnational bargaining is a complex question beyond the scope
of this Article.
134. Since Board remedies rarely, if ever, order the work to be returned to the old facility,
application of Fibreboard to foreign relocations would not necessarily pose possible extraterrito-
rial problems if the Board were to order the reinstatement of an employee whose "protected"
union activity and discharge occurred on foreign soil.
135. There have been a number of bills introduced in both the United States Senate and
House of Representatives attempting to deal with the problems of plant closures. See, e.g., Na-
tional Economic Dislocation Prevention Act of 1980, H.R. 7315, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG.
REc. 3451 (1980); Employment Maintenance Act of 1980, S. 2400, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126
CONG. REC. 2302 (1980); Employee Protection and Community Stabilization Act of 1979, S. 1609,
96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 10975 (1979); National Priorities Act of 1979, H.R. 5040,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 6994 (1979). Most of these bills, however, do not address
the practical problem of costs.
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relocation and the extent and scope of the collective-bargaining obligation will
continue in the evolving economy of the 1980's. Since these problems will not
disappear, they must be resolved before other related problems such as our
declining productivity rate can be solved.

